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Asia in the post-1991 period, complementing it with a detailed description of the general institutional and discursive structures within which this encounter took place.
KEYWORDS. Central Asian law; critical comparative law; law as imperialism; legal consciousness; legal globalization; Marxist critique of transnational legal processes; postSoviet legal history;
I.
This essay is the product of an intellectual encounter that began about a decade ago. At the centre of this encounter lie two texts. The first of these texts is Duncan Kennedy's Three Globalizations of Law (Kennedy 2006a) . In many ways, I suppose, it can be regarded as the main 'trigger event' behind this symposium and all the different debates that are reflected in it. The particular debate to which I imagine this essay to be a contribution, the debate about the globalisation of transnational modes of legal consciousness, would certainly not have taken place had it not been for Kennedy's ground-breaking article.
The second text in the shadow of which I develop my argument in these pages is Nicos Poulantzas's Internationalization of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State (Poulantzas 2008) . Though largely unfamiliar in contemporary legal circles, it represents to my mind what has to be regarded by any measure as one of the most important advancements in the critical study of global governance in the last fifty years. This essay should be considered a homage to that tradition of inquiry as much as it is to Kennedy's writings on legal globalisation, though it is mainly about the latter that I write here. 1 1 For an earlier rendition of the 'three globalizations of law' argument, see Kennedy 2003. 4 events and empty gestures. What is more, they did all this with such an air of intellectual certainty that one had really no idea if one ought to be simply worried or incensed.
Then again, what could one do about all these exercises in creative writing anyway? Given my inescapable embeddedness in that very reality which formed the object of those discourses, how was it possible for someone in my position to challenge the fictions they spawned without immediately opening oneself to the stereotypical charges of false loyalty and nativist bias? As soon as one stepped on that path anything one would say would be immediately challengeable as a projection of some misguided sense of patriotism or the failure to 'look at things objectively', and no matter how justified and legitimate it would be then to challenge those challenges as examples of standard Orientalist practices, dismissing them on such grounds could hardly do much to undermine the power of those fictions.
For, indeed, they were not just any old fictions but deeply systematised mythologies in the same sense in which one might say that every large-scale long-term discursive project relies, ultimately, for its success on the maintenance of a certain set of organizational mythologies that supply its foundational doxa and sustain its regime of illusio.
3 To expose these mythologies, however publicly, as fictitious or false would not do anything to their ability to endure. Not least because, as Althusser had pointed out, an ideological construct can never be 'dissipated' simply by the mere fact of it being outed as, say, a product of misrepresentation. The knowledge of its being such a product, however, he then went on to add immediately, can always help in the discovery of its underlying conditions of necessity (Althusser 1969, p. 230) . And it is here that I began to 3 My understanding of the concepts of doxa and illusion is based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1990) .
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see the beginnings of my response to the traditional narratives about the course of the post-Soviet legal and institutional reforms in Central Asia.
To put the matter slightly differently: rather than focusing on highlighting the essentially false and tendentious character of these narratives, the truly critical move would be to try to work out the broader logic which made the emergence of precisely this cluster of narratives the most probable ideological scenario in that particular context in which it occurred.
Kennedy's Three Globalizations of Law did not, admittedly, give me any direct answers to what this logic might be. But it gave me the necessary analytical apparatus that enabled me to start working towards it. And even though in the end this apparatus, too, would turn out somewhat insufficient -a fact the confirmation of which, however, would only become possible after the reintroduction of Kennedy's basic theoretical framework into that highly complex conceptual territory which Poulantzas mapped out in his essay -my sense of abiding gratitude to that essay remains as firm today as it was in those moments when I first glimpsed the tentative openings it showed me.
II.
There has arisen in recent years a very strongly pronounced -and not entirely unselfconscious -trend in the field of what could be broadly called Central Asian studies to present the general course of the history of post-independence political, institutional, and legal reforms in the region as, essentially, the history of a tragic failure. What is the exact nature of this failure? The details vary from one account to another, but the general contours seem quite stable. As appears to be commonly assumed by most commentators, scholarly and otherwise, the entire trajectory of legal, political and institutional transformations during the post-Soviet period in Central Asia can be fundamentally understood as the one long but ultimately aborted journey along the archetypal Fukuyamian trajectory, from the world of administrative planning and statist bureaucratism to the world of free-market economics and liberal democracy. Having started at some point in the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR, this journey, it is understood, continued more or less without any major hiccups through the mid-1990s, before coming to an abrupt end sometime around the turn of the century, this premature termination marking, symbolically, both a moment of tragedy and, from the perspective of those partners, a moment of failure.
The general framework structuring the process had a fairly familiar appearance.
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The primary goal was to effect a process of controlled transition conceptualised as the implementation of a carefully calibrated package of reforms aimed at the rebalancing of the relationship between the public and the private sectors, liberalisation of the economy, and comprehensive reorientation of the political system towards human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Given the condensed timeframes within which the whole process was to be completed and the fact that the essential question of what should be included in the reforms package had apparently already been settled through historical experience and as a matter of empirical political science, the role of the main vehicle for the realisation of the process was assigned to the national governments, the medium of 
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choice through which reforms were to be realised became legislative action, and the principal interface for the transmission of the substantive know-how at the core of the reforms package was to be the multitude of the various Western-sponsored technical assistance programmes. Law became the main site for the effectuation of transition, and the principal yardstick by which the success of the process was to be measured for the most part was to be sought in the approximation of the newly adopted legislative acts to international standards and global best practices passed on to the respective national governments by the respective teams of international experts.
Or, at least that was the general plan. What precipitated its unravelling at the start of the new century remains to a certain extent still a matter of debate. Most accounts, however, tend to converge around two principal sets of tropes both of which build on the classical theme of hostilely predisposed national elites. At one end of the spectrum, thus, one finds a cluster of tropes centred on the idea of a neo-Soviet revanchism. The common narrative here tends to suggest that the post-independence journey from administrative socialism to liberal democracy in Central Asia was aborted for the most part because the old nomenklatura types who had not been properly cut off from the positions of power in 1991, after weathering the storm of the early years of independence, had staged a successful comeback in the late 1990s, and in doing so bringing an end to all meaningful aspects of the reforms project, repressing civil liberties and democracy, co-opting the younger generation of leaders, and reinstituting old-school Soviet authoritarian order. 
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At the other end of the spectrum one finds a set of accounts focused around the themes of cultural determinism and endemic governmental corruption. Where the neoSoviet revanchism argument, thus, in effect seeks to reproduce the standard Orientalist repertoire by re-inscribing the basic Orientalist tropes into the body of the Soviet 'other', this set of accounts aim to recycle the Orientalist repertoire in its original, 'purer' form.
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The general narrative here tends to proceed from the assumption that what had really sunk the post-independence reforms project in Central Asia had, ultimately, nothing to do with its Soviet legacy. Rather, the key factor needs to be sought in the toxic combination of a strong clan-tribalist mentality historically shared across all Central Asian societies, The whole 'aborted journey' tradition of thought is a complete fiction. It fundamentally misrepresents the course of the post-independence history in the region.
By projecting a vision built around the idea of a radical historical rupture, it glosses over a whole swath of events, trends and patterns of change that spread across the region's legal, political and institutional space, having started long before the purported ruptural point and continuing well after it, often accelerating in speed, 11 the driving impetus for The imagery of aborted journeys and abrupt terminations makes it impossible to recognise these changes as anything other than essentially random events of fairly marginal significance. And yet even the most cursory examination of their design, content and reception would leave no room for doubt that they not only left the deepest impact on the structural configuration of the region's legal-political space but that they also, fundamentally, all have their origin in that complex, continuously evolving encounter between the post-Soviet world and the 'international community' that had started in the early 1990s and that, in some form or other, has continued to this day.
The 'aborted journey' tradition is a myth and its political bias is fundamentally reactionary. And yet the story it tries to convey is certainly not without critical value. It tells us something very important about the internal logic of this tradition. A closer reading of the two narrative patterns through which it expresses itself suggests that the real story which its proponents are trying to write is not, in fact, about the history of the post-independence reforms per se, as it is about the history of the basic relationship between Central Asian governments and Western-origined policy reform entrepreneurs acting, for the most part, under the heading of multilateral aid programmes aimed at the provision of technical assistance and good governance expertise. It is a story that, for the most part, unfolds across a sequence of three stages. Western counterparts were eager to teach and share. The main vehicle through which the transmission of this global 'know-how' was meant to proceed was legislative reform, and the main hero figure at the heart of the whole process was cast normally in the form of an internationally-experienced foreign legal expert, preferably male, white and Anglophone.
The expertise he would bring was meant to enable the newly independent Central Asian states to adopt in record short time the most innovative (de)regulatory and institutional techniques and launch their societies on the shiny road to freedom, justice and prosperity.
The future seemed bright and the wind unmistakably blew in the 'international' direction.
The Age of Enthusiasm did not last very long, though, unlike the first stage, the second stage did not on the whole have an easily identifiable starting point. In
Turkmenistan it probably started earlier (by most accounts, sometime around 1995); in Kyrgyzstan, later (by most accounts, sometime after 1998). In Tajikistan the process was not at all politically motivated. From the local point of view, the decisive momentum came from the ranks of the local technocratic communities, which, after the initial honeymoon period between them and their Western colleagues drew to an end, increasingly came to believe that the ever-widening stream of reform-related advice their states were getting from the international expert community was far more often than not a vehicle not just for 'bad economics' but also 'bad statecraft' and grounded in an atrociously poor understanding of the local institutional landscape and informal governance sectors. 12 The more the relevance of international expertise came to be questioned by the local technocratic communities, the more urgent the tone of the international institutions and their Western supporters started to become, the more entrenched, as a consequence, became the impression shared across the local political establishment that the entire reforms project may very well not be what it was initially presented to be. The increasingly obvious pattern of systematic mismanagement 13 and easily observable nepotism among the international expert community certainly did nothing to dispel that impression (Sievers 2003a, pp. 163-70 Central Asia on its own terms', the outcome of which was Central Asian governments' turning to 'bad policy and missing choices').
the theory of legal globalisation (and Poulantzas's essay too) can enable us to develop an interpretative angle that will explain the process behind this transition from the Age of Enthusiasm to the Age of Resentment far better than any of the narratives surveyed above. To see how this angle can be uncovered, we must take a few steps back.
III.
At the root of Kennedy's theory of legal globalisation lies the concept of legal consciousness. It needs to be noted right from the outset that, contrary to the obvious terminological parallels, it does not carry within it the same ideational content it would normally be saddled with in the orthodox Marxist discourse (Lukacs 1971, pp. 83-100), or, say, the Russo-Soviet tradition of socio-legal jurisprudence (Alekseev 1973 ). One should not, thus, view it as the projection of the quasi-Lukacsian formula of reification, nor as the name for that totality of attitudes and assumptions which are adopted within the broader social space with regard to the various elements of the positive legal order, such as, for example, the relationship between the judiciary and the executive or the law on arbitrary detention (Mal'ko 1996, p. 68) . Nor, at the same time, should it be understood also as the designation of the most widespread legal-theoretic beliefs adopted within the community of legal academics, if by legal theory one should understand here the kind of knowledge one would typically acquire in a specialised jurisprudence course.
The basic content inhabiting Kennedy's concept of legal consciousness, as it has developed over the last forty years (Kennedy 2006b, pp. xiv-xvii, 5- (Kennedy 2006a, pp. 22-3) .
Regardless of such terminological shifts, the conceptual construct at all points continues to exhibit the same two defining features.
In the first place, especially when used as a synonym for the idea of legal tradition (see Kennedy 2008, pp. 196-204) , it gives expression to what in a different context
Kennedy himself calls an organicist theoretical sensibility (see Kennedy 2001 Kennedy , pp. 1149 . The essential idea there seems to be that every mode of legal consciousness should be regarded, above all, as an integral part of some greater organic whole -that is to say, the only way in which one can begin to grasp its immediate specificity and internal logic is by understanding first the basic terms of its relationship with this greater whole by which it is constantly shaped and anchored (Kennedy 2001 (Kennedy , p. 1149 . What precisely may be the nature of this greater whole Kennedy never fully commits himself to explaining; at different points, thus, one finds indications suggesting it may be something like 'national culture', 'neoliberalism', 'capitalism', or even 'cultural imperialism'.
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In the second place, and very characteristically, Kennedy's concept of legal consciousness also tends to project a strongly semioticist theoretical vision (for The first challenge should not be difficult to deduce. Because of its essentially globalised character, the CLC, suggests Kennedy, has more or less flattened out all traditional differences that used to separate discrete national legal systems at the level of their operative organisational processes. As Kennedy puts it, 'national traditions [now] don't exist except as accumulated speech' (Kennedy 2008, p. 200 The second challenge is not so obvious. Even though it has an essentially globalised character the langue structure at the heart of the CLC, as Kennedy envisions it, is not an inherently global construct. Rather, every one of its main defining patterns has an easily traceable national origin. Thus, even though the practical reach of the CLC today may be truly universal, at its historical root one inevitably finds the same national signature: 'each of the traits of [the CLC] has a recognizable Unitedstatesean genealogy' (Kennedy 2006a, p. 67) . On this view of things, then, it is not so much the case anymore that the main question at the centre of the inquiry should be 'how do legal forms travel from one setting to another?' but, rather, 'what is the mechanism by which this diffusion from the national to the universal has been achieved?' Kennedy's own answer to this question can only be fully understood when one looks at what he considers to be the main distinguishing traits of the CLC mode.
IV.
There seem to be two main trends which characterise the CLC langue (Kennedy 2006a, p. 22) . One is the systematic move to balancing and proportionality techniques in all areas of legal reasoning. 19 The other is the 'seemingly contrary' rise of a neo-formalist sensibility, especially in the areas of constitutional, criminal and international legal reasoning. What makes this combination particularly curious, observes Kennedy, is its obvious self-denial: the neo-formalist mind constantly 'rebels in the name of "absolutes" This combination may seem at first quite a riddle, but at a deeper structural level, argues Kennedy, it makes perfect sense. The reason for that lies in the fact that, firstly, the CLC constitutes 'the endpoint of a long process in which the general concept of a right has risen … to become the universal legal linguistic unit', the most significant expression of which has been the ascendance of the human rights discourse. In a way, always operates on multiple levels and (b) is a concept that articulates most readily the notion of 'a claim against the "majority" or "dominant culture"', it is also an inevitable feature of this formalistic reasoning complex that it will constantly feel the pressure to organise the legal process as a process of pluralist mediation aimed at the reconciling of conflicting claims across different contexts, rather than their rigid enforcement in a Procrustean fashion (Kennedy 2006a, p. 66) . A theoretical framework thus configured, unsurprisingly enough, will then have no choice but to develop a deeply contradictory attitudinal combination: at the conscious surface a culture of neoformalism, beneath it an unreflective commitment to pragmatic balancing.
The identity/rights complex, continues Kennedy, may seem at first to be only 'a public law and family law phenomenon. But it is in fact a true lingua franca, just as applicable in the law of the market.' The conceptual structure built around an identitarian 22 sensibility ('even "the poor" [is now] an identity rather than a class') and the classical human-rights-inspired set of assumptions about how 'identities enter law' has penetrated every nook and cranny of the CLC landscape. Doctrines, regimes, and contestational settings that used to be articulated in terms of public policy or 'normal business practices' are systematically reorganised, under the CLC, on the basis of the identity/rights complex: from property and contract to competition and commercial law every aspect of legal practice is systematically remodelled on the basis of an analytical pattern that has been historically expressive of the non-discrimination debate in the human rights discourse (Kennedy 2006a, p. 66) . Even the international business community, observes
Kennedy, in an especially emblematic move 'adapted to the rise of identity rights rhetoric by transforming property ownership into a minoritarian identity and government regulation into the analogue of discrimination by legislative majorities' (Kennedy 2006a, p. 67 ).
The historical origins of this outlook that is at once formalist (and thus eminently given to privileging judicialised forms of legal reasoning) and identitarian (and thus eminently given to 'seeing' everything in terms of minority/majority relations and oppression/participation patterns) should not be a mystery:
The identity/rights complex, as a template for thinking about a vast range of legal issues, seems foreshadowed in the United States by the post-WWII alliance of elite WASPs, Jews, and blacks in the construction of the category of ethnicity, linking the evils of the Holocaust to those of racism in the United
States as illegal discrimination. US second-wave feminism is responsible for the abstraction and generalization of the category by transforming it into 'identity'. And it is familiar since de Tocqueville that Unitedstatseans tend towards juristocracy. (Kennedy 2006a, p. 68) Having been 'born' out of the US legal tradition, the identity/rights complex, contends In each of these contexts, Kennedy observes, 'the influence of the United States is manifest', the levers used in the service of this influence ranging from 'more or less violent' projections of hard power (Italy, Germany, and Japan after World War II) to 'refusal of trade' and economic pressure (USAID programmes, US influence over structural adjustment lending in the Third World), to soft power derived 'from prestige', to the rise of US transnational corporations, which brought with it the rise of the respective segment of the US law firm market (Kennedy 2006a, pp. 68-9) . by the 'aborted journey' tradition represents, thus, not so much an instance of a tragic failure for the grand modernisation project brought to the region by the reform entrepreneurs as an expression of its fundamental success, for the manner in which, first, the mounting scepticism of the local establishment came to be articulated and, second, the rhetoric of rejection with which the national governments subsequently came to greet those parts of the reforms package which they did not welcome on political grounds was essentially that of the neoformalist identity/rights model-inspired discourse.
Looking from this angle, it seems impossible not to notice how closely the general framework that structured this whole process resonates with various parts of Kennedy's account. 
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Principal agents of the reforms project
The main impetus for the reforms project traditionally has come from the United States, occasionally flanked by its EU partners (Britain, Germany, Finland, etc.) , and the 'international civil society' manifested through a network of predominantly Westernbased transnational NGOs (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, etc.). The former have acted primarily through a network of bilateral aid and technical assistances projects operated by the USAID and the EU TACIS programme, the Bretton-Woods
Institutions (BWI), and, to a lesser extent, UN-linked bodies (UNDP, UNHCHR, etc.) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The latter has acted mainly through Western expatriate communities buttressed by a thin layer of local counterparts financed through charitable donations and grant schemes operated by Western governments and, occasionally, a private donor community (Soros foundation).
Secondary agents of the reforms project
A further impulse that has reinforced the diffusion of the CLC langue came from the arrival into the Central Asian business scene of a range of powerful Western multinationals (Shell, Chevron, General Motors, etc.), closely followed by the leading transnational law firms (Baker & McKenzie, White & Case, Mayer Brown, etc.) . A consistent pattern among the former has been that they predominantly seem to represent the traditional power bases of the transnational industrial capital (but rarely transnational finance capital) and that they often seek to establish contact with local government elites directly (rather than rely on their embassies).
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21 Given the stakes involved, it seems it would also be of value to note who was not on the list of the dramatis personae or who, relatively speaking, significantly under-contributed to the application of the 26
Principal tools and avenues used for the advancement of the reforms project
Overall, there have been seven discrete sets of tools and institutional avenues that were used to advance the reforms projects:
• US embassy and the USAID;
• EU TACIS projects;
• conditional loans and credit facilities from the BWI;
• bilateral investment treaties with Western states;
• international regime monitoring and reporting schemes (mainly, the UN human rights system and the OSCE);
• public and private aid initiatives coordinated by UNDP-and BWI-related structures;
• international human rights NGOs;
• bilateral and multilateral inter-governmental exchange and partnership
programme.
An important element of the equation at all times has also remained the promotion and popularisation of Western-style legal education. This was achieved in practice in some cases through the creation of foreign campuses and regional branches for select Western universities (the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek, the Westminster University in Tashkent VI.
But where does Poulantzas's essay fit in all of this? What is its contribution to this story?
In a nutshell, the answer seems to me to be twofold. First, it illuminates the underlying logic of that organicist dynamic which 'feeds' and 'anchors' the diffusion of the CLC as a world-historic process. Despite its obvious theoretical centrality to Kennedy's concept of legal consciousness, the organicist part remains by and large absent from his discussions of the operative mechanics of legal globalisation. Not so with Poulantzas. In the second place, it also uncovers the essentially imperialistic character of the diffusionary process, which in turn helps develop a greater insight into the general role of the CLC in the production of the broader regime of global governance -but also exploitation.
26 I borrow the concept of 'self-Orientalism' here from Scott Newton.
Like Kennedy, Poulantzas, who is writing in the early 1970s, in the aftermath of the first Oil Crisis, is interested, to a large extent, in explaining the historical conditions of those processes which to the less attentive eyes come across as 'Americanisation'. His principal goal, however, is not so much to describe the internal genealogy of these processes with a view to demonstrating, as Kennedy aims to do, that as these processes began to take off their content increasingly 'lost its distinctive Unitedstatesean quality' (Kennedy 2006a, p. 70) . Quite on the contrary, Poulatnzas seeks expressly to reinsert the idea of a distinctive US national signature into the debate about international governance modalities that increasingly seeks to portray them as always-already (and rather unproblematically) globalised in content and character.
The argument has four parts:
(i) In its extended reproduction, late-stage capitalism is characterised 'by a double tendency: its reproduction within a social formation where it "takes root" and establishes its dominance, and its extension to the exterior of this formation, the two aspects … acting at the same time' (Poulantzas 2008, p. 223 Programme: it is not the actual physical misery they suffer in their toil but their systematic separation from the product of their labour which turns workers into an exploited class; even when the level of absolute wages increases, the relationship of exploitation is not thereby abolished. 27 Thus, even when the intensity of direct imperial governance over the given social formation never rises above the minimum threshold, the imperial character of the relationship is not dissipated.
(ii) Projecting Poulantzas's argument about social formations into the present context, one can extend this account to the geo-juridical dynamics of interaction between distinct legal systems. Starting from this angle gives us at once a much better conceptual handle with which to grasp the internal structure of the geo-juridical global space than Kennedy's world-systems-theory-inspired 'locales of production' and 'locales of reception'; 28 and an explanation why, despite the fact that there appears to be little direct 27 '[T]he system of wage labour is a system of slavery, and indeed of a slavery which becomes more severe in proportion as the social productive forces of labour develop, whether the worker receives better or worse payment' (Marx 1875, Part II) .
oppression of the European legal space by the US legal tradition, it still makes sense to describe that relationship as one of dominance and subordination.
More specifically, it allows us, firstly, to uncover with greater clarity the general organicist logic behind the diffusion of the CLC and also the particular mechanics by which this process reaches those domains in which it takes place:
The mode of production of the metropoles is reproduced in a specific form in the very interior of the dominated and dependent formations.
[T]his induced reproduction of the [capitalist mode adopted within the metropoles] within these formations extends in a decisive manner to the sphere of their state apparatuses and their ideological forms. (Poulantzas 2008, p. 226) Secondly, by analogising the concept of the mode of production to the mode of legal consciousness, it allows us to explain also the exact meaning of the broader structure of the geo-juridical global space as it exists today: (Poulantzas 2008, p. 227) This pattern of dependence, however, is not identical to the one that characterises the relationship between the metropoles and the global peripheries 'precisely to the extent reception with only minimal dialectical counterinfluence on the transnational mode, and cases in between.
German legal thought was in this sense hegemonic between 1850 and 1900, French legal thought between 1900 and some time in the 1930s, and Unitedstatesean legal thought after 1950.'
33 that these mteropoles continue to constitute real centres of capital accumulation [AR:
read 'production of elements of the CLC'] and to dominate the peripheral formations' (Poulantzas 2008, p. 227) .
(iii) The most obvious expression of the rising 'dominance of American capital' for Poulantzas comes from three inter-linked patterns: the increase in the volume of the US capital investments abroad, including in Europe, especially in areas traditionally most given to capital concentration and centralisation dynamics (Poulantzas 2008, pp. 228-9) ; the growing predominance of the Foreign Direct Investment model over 'investment in securities' (Poulantzas 2008, p. 229) ; the increasing penetration of the organisational models and patterns of the division of labour characteristic of the US business experience into the 'interior' even of those multinational firms whose capital bases seem to come simultaneously from several different states (Poulantzas 2008, pp. 238-40) .
What is the value of this particular set of observations? Quite considerable:
adopting the same kind of analogist assumption as before gives us a much better grasp of the third main mechanism in Kennedy's story of how the CLC was diffused. It is not just the 'development of the US-style large international law firms' and non-profit public interest NGOs that we should focus our attention on as we proceed to trace the course of this diffusionary process. It is the spread of the distinctly US American (as opposed to, say, German or English) model for the organisation of the market of legal services and public interest lawyership on the whole; the establishment of direct presence by US firms and NGOs in foreign legal systems as well as the subsumption of local partner firms and NGOs in US-dominated alliances; the transfer of previously US-based top level partners into new foreign subsidiaries as well as the promotion of local staff to partnership on the strength of their previous experience in the US legal system (e.g. through graduate level education). With a certain reformulation (e.g, by substituting 'base of capital accumulation' for 'source of social and discursive capital'), I believe, this distinction can be adapted to describe a similar cleavage in the configuration of the 'national legal elites' and, perhaps, other similarly placed technocratic communities.
The relevance of such an operation should not be too difficult to deduce. After all, one of Kennedy's main motivations in developing his account in the first place was the aspiration to provide some sort of roadmap for how the 'progressive elites of the periphery' may resist against mechanically 'accept[ing] the prescription of the center that
they simply "open" their economies and "reform" their legal systems, and accept the consequences for good or ill' (Kennedy 2006a, p. 24) . Or, to look at it from a slightly different angle, one of the main questions that the story of the post-independence legalglobalisational encounter in Central Asia, retold in these pages, leaves to Kennedy's theory is precisely the question of what sort of conditions need to be present in the 35 constitution of the social base of those national elites of the periphery, for the resistance project of the kind he describes to become successful.
